Separate authority tiers
Define read, recommend, draft, approve, and execute independently; promotion to a higher tier requires explicit evidence and ownership.
Treat an agent as an actor with bounded authority, not as a chatbot with API keys. Every tool action should resolve to a tenant, user or service identity, allowed operation, evidence record, and safe recovery path.
By Onyx Devs Lab · Published · Updated
A single “agent access” permission is too coarse for production.
Define read, recommend, draft, approve, and execute independently; promotion to a higher tier requires explicit evidence and ownership.
Resolve the requesting user, tenant, service account, source session, and target-system identity; never rely only on a shared model credential.
Allow specific systems, objects, fields, actions, amounts, time windows, and environments; deny everything else by default.
The audit record should explain what the system attempted and what actually happened.
Record the user request, applicable policy, retrieved evidence, model and prompt version, decision, and human confirmation where required.
Record tool name, validated arguments, target identity, idempotency key, timestamp, response, resulting state, and verification readback.
Provide revoke and kill paths, separation of duties, exception queues, retries, compensating actions, alerting, incident review, and retention rules.
List every system the agent can reach and classify each operation by data sensitivity, reversibility, financial effect, and user consequence.
Connect users, tenants, roles, service accounts, approval thresholds, and target-system permissions to enforceable rules.
Attempt cross-tenant access, missing confirmation, duplicate execution, stale state, partial failure, timeout, revocation, and recovery.
Start with read or recommendation, measure exceptions, and promote only the actions whose evidence and recovery controls pass the agreed gates.
Usually not. Generic logs may omit the requesting identity, policy decision, validated arguments, confirmation, resulting state, and recovery evidence needed to reconstruct an action.
Only if downstream authorisation still preserves tenant and user policy, action limits, and attribution. A shared credential must not erase who requested or approved the action.
At minimum, irreversible, external, regulated, high-value, or privilege-changing actions should use explicit confirmation unless a documented risk decision approves a narrower automated envelope.
No. This provider-authored engineering checklist complements, but does not replace, the organisation’s security architecture, threat model, legal duties, and incident procedures.
We will first clarify the workflow, evidence, data boundary, and outcome standard before recommending the next step.
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